Competition problems arise when competition is not sufficient at one or more commercial levels. Section 4 of Competition Protection Act 4054 (the “Competition Act”) prohibits any agreement between companies with the purpose or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition. The types of agreements mentioned above include vertical agreements. Vertical restrictions such as resale price maintenance (RPM), most advantageous clauses for customers, exclusive transactions, discount schemes, non-competition clauses and reverse non-competition clauses are often a success in the history of competition law enforcement in Turkey. Compared to other vertical agreements, there is more flexibility. For example, the following types of agreements are not considered “pure” under the category exemption (they are called “non-hardcore”): contracting parties may include contractual restrictions or obligations in vertical agreements to protect an investment or to ensure day-to-day activity (e.g. B sales, supply or purchase agreements). Article 101, paragraph 1 of the TFUE prohibits agreements between companies with the purpose or effect of restricting, preventing or distorting competition within the Union and affecting trade between EU Member States. This prohibition is relevant to all agreements between two or more companies, whether they are competitors. Vertical agreements are widely accepted because they are less likely to solve competition problems than horizontal agreements. Horizontal agreements are concluded between two current or potential competitors.
Some vertical agreements probably have restrictions that do not comply with Article 101 of the TFUE. These are agreements that contain provisions: This glossary corresponds to the list of keywords used by the competition search engine. Each keyword is automatically updated by the latest EU and national jurisdictions of the e-Competitions bulletin and competition review. The definitions are included in the DG COMP glossary on EU competition policy concepts (© European Union, 2002) and the OECD glossary of competition rules (© OECD, 1993). It is only when a contextual assessment has a “sufficiently damaging” effect on competition (or the absence of credible welfare virtues) that an agreement can be considered an “object” within the meaning of Article 101, paragraph 1, of the EUTF.  Even in cases where a class exemption does not apply, a vertical agreement may still benefit from an individual exemption.